The need for effective supervision of capital markets is becoming all the more evident in the aftermath of the recent LIBOR and rate rigging scandals. Financial regulators or indeed bank regulators cannot perform such a function effectively without the involvement of auditors in the supervisory process. A challenging task awaits the incoming Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney -particularly given the reduced involvement of auditors in the bank supervisory process since the time of assumption of the Financial Services Authority's bank supervisory functions.
Introduction
− "As a result of the recent banking crisis, the UK government announced a number of proposed changes to the UK financial regulatory structure. Following the proposed changes, the Bank of England will become the single authority with responsibility for preserving financial stability and providing protection to the wider economy as a whole. In addition, under the proposed Financial Services Bill, the FSA will cease to exist in its current form and will be replaced by three new bodies -the Financial Policy Committee, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority."
As highlighted in the publications and the book "The Role of the External Auditor in Bank Regulation and Supervision," 1 the Financial Services Authority (FSA)'s statutory objective of maintaining confidence in the financial system is one that gave rise to concern. This largely being as a result of the reduced role which the Financial Services Authority's predecessor, the Bank of England, assumed in the supervisory process since 1997. Principle 19 of the Basel Core Principles highlights the importance of supervisors in acquiring and sustaining a thorough knowledge not only of individual banks and banking groups being regulated, but also of the banking system in its entirety. Such supervisory role is considered to be a role which in my opinion, the Bank of England would have carried out more effectively than the then designated supervisor, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The effectiveness of the arrangement (whereby the FSA sought to achieve the objective of maintaining confidence in the financial system and the Bank of England continued responsibility for overall stability of the financial system) in dealing with systemic risks, was put to the test following the collapse of Northern Rock. The major criticism of the crisis at Northern Rock related to the tripartite arrangement between the Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury. The apparent lack of clarity as regards the allocation of responsibilities between these authorities was revealed following the "buck-passing" and failure by appropriate authorities to promptly spot problems at Northern Rock. The Northern Rock crisis highlighted problems and flaws inherent in the tripartite arrangement between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England for dealing with financial stability. Hence, the Bank of England has been involved in (but not responsible for) the bank supervisory process through the process whereby it exchanges information with the FSA for bank supervisory purposes. In that sense, it still makes vital contribution to the regulatory and supervisory process. Under the FSA, contact between auditors and itself declined from being routine and annual to an exceptional matter.
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This decline resulted from the FSA's riskbased approach to supervision.
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The change from section 39 reporting accountants' reports to section 166 skilled persons' reports also played a part.
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As a result, in contrast to the Bank of England which regularly used auditors/reporting accountants to help with supervision, the FSA frequently used its own front-line supervisors for risk assessment purposes.
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The main benefit of an indirect system of supervision 14 whereby the external auditor acts as an intermediary between the regulator and the regulated institutions is that it provides for the most effective means of obtaining and evaluating crucial information relating to the well-being of the financial institution. of protecting the financial system without assessment of the functioning of the firms in the market.
Same applies to the FSA. In order to achieve its objectives to the financial system, public, market and consumers, the FSA needed to develop closer links with the market and consumers.
As well as developing better links with the market and consumers, the FSA has also required early warning indicators -indicators which its predecessor, the Bank of England was possibly better equipped with. and their ability to undertake other specialised functions which are particularly necessary in a business environment in which computer technology and diverse risks have evolved. The FSA places great reliance on the cooperation of regulated firms to provide information which is timely, accurate and complete in order to be able to gauge whether a firm is complying with its requirements. Auditors can help facilitate efficiency within the supervisory process as they are also required under the FSMA to inform the FSA of certain matters of concern and have to provide annual reports to the FSA. The FSA in its proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not getting 'captured' by those it is supposed to be regulating.
However, the FSA's effectiveness in carrying out its bank supervisory functions has been impacted tremendously, not only because it is less equipped to handle the responsibility than the Bank of England, but because its risk based approach to supervision has also reduced the involvement of those who could have assisted it in effectively exercising its functions -namely, the external and also has the resources to recruit and retain high calibre staff. He adds that in those circumstances, the effectiveness of financial services regulation could be compromised if this function were removed from the central bank.
Benefits in having a single regulator for financial services (as exemplified and embodied by the FSA) amongst other things, included better management of risks generated by various types of businesses and their associations. This is an attribute which cannot be provided by the central bank -whether or not it performs just the sole function of monetary policy setting or additional supervisory responsibilities. Likewise the knowledge and expertise of the central bank is something which cannot be generated by a single regulator. The main issue should be whether a particular jurisdiction benefits more or less from having a single regulator in comparison to having a functional regulator. In my opinion, the function of monetary policy setting is one which should be carried out by the central bank alone. In addition, the question of achieving the right design of regulatory structure of a particular jurisdiction will need to be examined against the background of a particular financial structure of each country rather than being generalised.
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According to Goodhart and Schoenmaker, there are many reasons in favour of the central bank also acting as supervisor 24 and these are as follows:
That the central bank must have concern for the efficient working of the payments system and that as a result, it should also supervise and regulate at least the main money-market commercial banks at the heart of the system; That any rescue or liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can only be done by the central bank. In other words, the supervisory approach was in essence reactive and it was designed and built around the premise that regulators should only intervene following observable failings relative to a set of rules rather than seek to prevent potential failure in the future.
The pre-crisis regime also lacked the necessary tools to support the orderly failure of a bank. There was no bank resolution regime and the deposit protection regime was not sufficient to ensure depositor confidence. Both of these two failings have been addressed in recent legislation."
The FSA has also acknowledged that a transfer of bank supervisory powers back to the Bank of England does not serve as a guarantee that future crises would be prevented -since bank related crises had also occurred during the Bank's regime as supervisor. In response to the need to ensure that adequate facilities are in place to facilitate the work of the Bank of England as well as to strengthen the new regulatory system, further measures and investigations have been undertaken and are still being undertaken.
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In particular, several criticisms have been highlighted in relation to the Bank of England's inability to address certain issues during the recent Financial Crisis and these are as follows:
28 − "That the Bank failed to take action as the credit bubble grew, and indeed stoked the excesses with too easy a monetary policy;
− That the inflation remit has been applied in an inconsistent, asymmetric and self-evidently ineffective manner. The MPC banked the external influences during the good years when it was depressing inflation, but asks us to look through these pressures now that it is adding to it;
− That the Bank compounded the loss of financial confidence in the early stages of the crisis by denying the banking system the liquidity support desperately needed to avert calamity. Having highlighted the above criticisms, one of the major reasons which could be advanced in support of the Bank of England's capacity and ability to effectively exercise bank supervisory responsibilities -at least to a greater extent than the FSA, will be discussed in the following section. "One concern is that the bank has lost too much of the tacit knowledge of the workings of the financial-services industry needed to be a good all-round regulator. When the bank took over interest-rate policy from the Treasury in 1997, it gave up its role as manager of public debt as well as its job supervising banks. That reduced the contact between bank staff and the City. And the primacy of the inflation mandate diminished the status of the bank's financial-stability wing.
Ambitious youngsters steered clear; some experienced staff left. When crisis struck, the bank was stuffed with smart economists but short of folk with a feel for finance. It will take time to restore the balance. A bigger worry now is that the proliferation of committees will lead to internal strife........"
The role and impact of audits, auditors and accounting in the bank supervisory process is further Furthermore, it was conceded that a Code of Practice would be insufficient to address the issues at hand and that a statutory obligation would also be required.
D. Conclusion
There has always been a strong conviction and argument for the case that bank supervisory 
